AN ECONOMIC GUIDE TO COMPETITIVE STANDARDS
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
Alexander C. Larson*

Several industries traditionally subject to economic
regulation, such as transportation, electric utilities,
and energy, are involved in a transition toward reduced regulation or deregulation.' In the case of telecommunications, competitive pressures in the local

exchange and access services markets, and public
policy goals (e.g., network modernization, telecommunications infrastructure enhancement, efficient
diffusion of advanced network technologies) have required policymakers at both the state and federal
levels to reevaluate telecommunications regulation,
with an eye toward supplanting it with competitive
market forces where possible.
Further, it is generally true that starting in 1959
with the Federal Communications Commission's
("FCC" or "Commission") Above 890 decision, entry into telecommunications markets has in large
part been deregulated, whereas pricing by large incumbent telephone companies has not, resulting in a
system commonly known as asymmetric regulation.
None of this has led to pervasive deregulation of the
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"),
AT&T, or large "Tier 1" local exchange carriers
("LECs") such as GTE, though in the 1980s there
were trends toward deregulating both the entry conditions' and the pricing conditions for non-Bell com-
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I HENRY ADLER EINHORN & WILLIAM PAUL SMrrH, EcoNOMIC ASPECTS OF ANTITRUST: READINGS AND CASES 7-8
(1968).
Regarding regulation of transportation see, e.g., Staggers
Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895
(1985)(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101a); Motor Carrier Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 10101); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301); regarding electric utilities, see Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978)(codified at 16
U.S.C. § 2601); regarding gas pipelines, see Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978) (codified

at 15 U.S.C. §3301).
8 In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890
Megacycles, Report and Order, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959) [hereinafter Above 890](allocating radio spectrum in the frequency above
890 megacycles to private microwave users regardless of whether
common carrier service was available to them); In re Microwave
Communications, Inc., Initial Decision, 18 F.C.C.2d 979, 1010
Herbert
by
Hearing Examiner
(1969)(ruling
Sharfman)(granting a license to MCI enabling it to construct a
microwave network between St. Louis and Chicago to provide
private line services on a common carrier basis); In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Applications to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services, FirstReport and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971)(establishing an overall
policy concerning new entry to the private line market by what
were designated as "specialized common carriers," and ruling
that the local exchange carriers must, upon request, permit these
carriers to interconnect with their facilities); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978)(ruling that MCI's Execunet service, although substantially equivalent to AT&T's MTS and
WATS service, was lawful); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980

The concept of 'workable' or 'effective' competition can
perhaps best be described as the economists' attempt to
identify the conditions which could provide appropriate
leads for policy in assuring society the substance of the
advantages which competition should provide. It is a kind
of economist's 'Rule of Reason'-not, of course, to be confused with the legal rule of reason, but analogous to it in
the sense that it is also an acknowledgement of the inevitability of the exercise of human judgment and discretion
1
in classifying different forms of economic behavior.
-Henry Adler Einhorn and William Paul Smith
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panies.4 In addition, there have been related trends
toward supplanting standard rate base rate of return
regulation with improved methods such as price ceil-

ing regulation, 5 allowing nonstructural safeguards in
lieu of structural separation,6 streamlining the regu-

(1978)(reversing Petition of AT&T for a Declaratory Ruling
and Expedited Relief, FCC 78-142, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, released Feb. 28, 1978, which granted an AT&T petition
for declaratory ruling that it was under no obligation to provide
interconnection for Execunet service); In re MTS and WATS
Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, 81 F.C.C.2d 177 (1980)(formally adopting an open entry policy for all interstate services,
including MTS and WATS); In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic
Public Switched Network Services, Report and Order, 83
F.C.C.2d 167 (1980)(prohibiting tariff restrictions on the resale
and shared use of MTS and WATS services); United States v.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 195-99 (D.D.C. 1982) (Modification
of Final Judgment), af/'d sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983)(requiring the Bell Operating Companies
and GTE to offer "1 +" equal access, otherwise known as Feature Group D); In re MTS and WATS Market Structure Phase
III, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 860 (1985)(extending
equal access obligations to the non-GTE independent telephone

services of carriers affiliated with exchange telephone companies;
miscellaneous common carriers; and digital electronic message
service networks); id., Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d
1020 (1985), rev'd and remanded sub. nom., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(striking down FCC's attempt to eliminate nondominant tariff as
abuse of discretion in interpreting the Communications Act of
1934); In re AT&T Communications v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,7 FCC Red. 807
(1992)(upholding FCC's "forbearance" rule for past conduct
and adopting companion order); In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, Notice of ProposedRule
Making, 7 FCC Rd. 804 (1992)(instituting a proceeding to
consider changes in the "forbearance" rule); In re Tariff Filing
Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, Report and Order, 7 FCC Red. 8072 (1992)(reaffirming FCC's detariffing
rules); AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992), reh'g en
banc denied, Jan. 21, 1993 (vacating the Fourth Report, Competitive CanierProceeding, and remanding the complaint proceeding to the FCC); In re Tariff Filing Requirements for
Nondominant Common Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CC Docket No. 93-36, released February 19, 1993, at para.
13 (proposing to streamline tariff filing rules "to the maximum
extent possible"). See Walt Sapranov, "Forbearance"Reversed:
FCC Detariffing Policies Come to an End, TELECOMM. REP.
(Regulatory Update) 1 (Jan. 1993).
1 James M. Fink, The Battle Over the Rewrite of Illinois'
Telecommunications Law: Is More Reform Needed?, 15 PULA
527, 543 (July-Dec. 1992)("At least 16 states have statutes expressly authorizing their public service commissions to adopt alternative forms of regulation for noncompetitive services: Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington."). See id.
at 544. ("The public utility commissions from at least 16 other
states have adopted alternative regulation plans for noncompetitive services based upon their existing general administrative authority conferred by statute: Alabama, California, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico,
New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.") Many other states have undertaken
review or analysis of alternative forms of regulation since 1991.
1 See generally In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, (Third Computer Inquiry), Phase I Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986)(replacing structural separation with nonstructural safeguards such
as Comparably Efficient Interconnection in the short term and
Open Network Architecture in the long run); see In re Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service from Costs of
Nonregulated Activities, Report and Order, 2 FCC Red. 1298
(1987)(requiring the Tier I local exchange carriers to develop
Cost Allocation Manuals as a nonstructural safeguard in lieu of
structural separation); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates
for Dominant Carriers, Report and Order and Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873 (1989)(supplanting rate of return regulation with price ceiling regulation
for interstate long distance services provided by AT&T); id.,
Second Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786 (1990)(supplanting
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L. JOHNSON,
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AND
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INDUSTRY, (RAND Corporation Monograph
R-2976-RC/NSF)(1982); ANDREW D. LIPMAN, TELECOM DEREGULATION (1987); Richard H.K. Vietor, AT&T and the
THE

TELEPHONE

Public Goo& Regulation and Competition in Telecommunications, 1910-1987, in FUTURE COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 27 (Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds.,
1989).
4 In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
Common Carrier Services, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule
Making, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979) [collectively Competitive Carrier Proceedings]; id., First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1
(1980)(defining the "dominant" and "nondominant" classifications of firms subject to regulation); id., FurtherNotice of Proposed Rule Making, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981); id., Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982), recon. denied, 93
F.C.C.2d 54 (1983)(forbearing resellers from full Title II regulations); id., Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
47 Fed. Reg. 17,308 (1982); id., Third FurtherNotice of Proposed Rule Making, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,292 (1983); id., Third Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983)(extending scope of
proceeding to include services provided to all domestic points
outside the United States, including Hawaii, Guam and Puerto
Rico); id., Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554
(1983)(ruling that domestic satellite carriers, companies owning
satellite transponders, direct broadcast satellite common carriers,
and various other carriers lacking market power should be characterized as nondominant); id., Fourth FurtherNotice of Proposed Rule Making, 96 F.C.C.2d 922 (1984); id., Fifth Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984)(extending forbearance to
domestic satellite carriers; all domestic, interstate, interexchange
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latory process, 7 and affording "dominant" carriers
some measure of pricing flexibility. 8 Further, at least
seventeen states provide for the complete deregulation of competitive service revenues. 9
An important underpinning of policies involving
deregulation, lessened regulation or pricing flexibility for a telecommunications service is the issue of
whether a particular service is subject to significant
competition. If it is, then policies such as deregulation and open entry may be the best ones for policymakers to pursue. If a market is not sufficiently competitive, however, policies such as deregulation may
be premature and run counter to the public interest.
Thus, an important question to ask is: What indicators can policymakers use to determine if a market is
sufficiently competitive to allow relaxed regulatory
scrutiny of firms normally assumed "dominant" in
the eyes of public utility law? Similarly, what indicators only appear to be helpful but are actually of
limited usefulness? One must answer these questions
to comply with various laws governing telecommunications regulation, and usually the answers are
found in economic analysis. This Article will provide
a guide to these answers, and a non-technical bridge
to the economics literature for the attorney involved
in competitive standards in telecommunications law.
B.

For Sound Public Policy, What Is the Meaning
of a "Competitive Market"?

In FCC notices of proposed rulemaking
("NPRM") and orders, state public utility commisrate of return regulation with price ceiling regulation for interstate access services provided by the local exchange carriers); In
re Southwestern Bell Telephone Company's Proposal for Network Modernization, Rate Stability and Pricing Regulation a/
k/a/ "TELEKANSAS," Docket No. 166,856-U, Order (Feb. 2,
1990)(supplanting rate of return regulation with indexed price
cap regulation in Kansas).
In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880 (1991); In re Decreased Regulation of Certain Basic Telecommunications Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 2 FCC Rcd. 645
(1987). But see In re Decreased Regulation of Certain Basic
Telecommunications Services, Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 5412
(1990)(proceeding terminated).
B In re Guidelines for Dominant Carriers' MTS Rates and
Rate Restructure Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 50
Fed. Reg. 42,946 (1985)(proposing the net revenue test as a
means of testing the lawfulness of price reductions in the form of
optional calling plans). But see In re Local Exchange Carriers'
Individual Case Basis DS3 Service Offerings, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 8634 (1989), recon. pending
(finding that individual case basis (ICB) rates for Special Access
DS3 and DS3-equivalent services of Regional Bell Operating

sion ("PUC") orders, speeches by major policymakers, and other documents involving telecommunications policy, one often hears of the benefits of
"competition." Indeed, with the possible exception of
the phrase "level playing field," "competition" is
probably the most pervasive, yet debated term used
of late to advance telecommunications public policy.
Given that public policy could supplant telecommunications regulation with so-called "competitive market forces," what should be the standard for "competitive market forces," or simply "competition"?
Clearly, there are many interpretations of this latter
term, depending on whether the user is a regulator,
an economist, a competitor of the LECs, a telecommunications consumer, or a consumer advocate. For
some, competition means a proliferation of suppliers.
While a proliferation of suppliers could prevent the
exercise of market power, such a situation would be
meaningless if many of them were economically inefficient and incapable of surviving in a market in
which public utility regulation of large incumbent
firms was absent. Others use the term to refer to a
situation in which a few firms in an industry compete vigorously for sales-each firm trying to get
customers for itself at the expense of its rivals.1" This
latter definition of competition is favored by many
antitrust tribunals."
There are also economists who will speak of an
industry as being a "contestable market." By this is
meant an industry in which there are no sunk costs
of entry, prices adjust instantaneously, and firms
(both existent and potential) expect that increased
Companies, GTE Telephone Operating Companies, and other
local exchange carriers were unlawful because the ICB rates

filed for DS3 services were unreasonably discriminatory; ordering LECs to convert most existing ICB rates for DS3 and DS3equivalent service to nondiscriminatory,
rates).
I Fink, supra note 5, at 573-74.

generally available

10

DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MOD-

ERN

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 94 (1990). A checklist of

structure, conduct and performance norms for workable competition are listed in GAVIN C. REID, THEORIES OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 125 (1987).

"1 See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp.
Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986).
Competition is a ruthless process. A firm that reduces cost
and expands sales injures rivals-sometimes fatally. The
firm that slashes costs the most captures the greatest sales
and inflicts the greatest injury. The deeper the injury to
rivals, the greater the potential benefit. These injuries to
rivals are byproducts of vigorous competition, and the antitrust laws are not balm for rivals' wounds. The antitrust
laws are for the benefit of competition, not competitors.
Id.
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sales are achieved by undercutting rivals' prices." At
one extreme of the contestable market model, a sole
supplier may choose to set prices at marginal cost
because of the threat of potential entry by competitors.' 3 At the other extreme is the economist's maxim
of "perfect competition," in which there are many
atomistic suppliers, none of whom is large enough to
influence the market price with their output levels,
all of whom are price-takers (i.e., they assume that
the market price is given, and that they can sell all of
their output at that market price).' 4 In between these
two extremes, though not necessarily a subset of the
contestable market model, is the concept of a "workably competitive" (or "reasonably competitive")
market. A workably competitive market may exhibit
characteristics such as independent price setting, a
large number of firms, and free entry and exit, but
not conform perfectly to the theoretical maxims of
the perfectly competitive market or other models embraced within the contestable market model (by virtue of non-zero sunk costs of entry, a lack of truly
atomistic suppliers, etc.).' 5

Thus, the economics literature has produced many
elegant theories of competition and the competitive
process, but when stripped to its pragmatic essence,
competition exists when customers have alternative
sources of supply-either actual or potential-at
prices they regard as comparable.16 True competition involves lawful battles for market share, which
can involve the spirited offering by competitors of
comparable quality service at lower prices, greater
quality service for a given price, lower quality service at a commensurably lower price, or lower prices
combined with greater quality. This is the essence of
competition: offering consumers better alternatives
than one's rivals by dint of skill, foresight, and industry. A market can be considered competitive if the
level of competition from firms that produce reasonably close substitutes is sufficient to rule out the exer12
13

See, e.g., REID, supra note 10, at 142.
A natural monopoly supplier may choose to set prices at

the optimal Ramsey prices in the event that scale economies prevent the recovery of all costs at marginal cost prices.
14 A perfectly contestable market has a perfectly competitive
market embraced within it. A perfectly competitive market is

necessarily contestable, but many imperfectly competitive markets (e.g., monopoly) can be contestable. Both the perfectly competitive model and the perfectly contestable model have free entry and exit, but in perfect competition, sellers are necessarily
atomistic, and each seller assumes his output decisions cannot
influence the market price. A contestable market, however, may
have a small number of firms, or even just one. See REID, supra
note 10, at 142.
"9

CARLTON &

PERLOFF,

supra note 10, at 94.
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cise of significant market power,1 7 or, if the level of
competition from potential entrants is sufficient to
rule out the exercise of significant market power.18
A useful interpretation of the last definition of
competition is that of Judges Posner and
Easterbrook:
'Competition' may be read as a shorthand expression, a
term of art, designating any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alternative state of affairs through judicial decree. Conversely,
'monopoly' and 'restraint of trade' would be terms of art
for situations in which consumer welfare could be so improved, and to 'monopolize' or engage in 'unfair competition' would be to use practices inimical to consumer
welfare.1 9

The discussion of competitive standards in telecommunications in this Article will proceed largely
in the spirit of this interpretation of competition.
Note that the economist's concept of perfect competition is not the basis of the discussion of competition
in this Article. Although there are demand and cost
conditions under which striving toward the maxim of
perfect competition best serves the public interest,
there are many other conditions that prove rivalry
among a small number of firms to be more economically efficient than rivalry among a large number of
them. Again borrowing the words of Judges Posner
and Easterbrook, "The economic model of perfect
competition was never intended as a policy prescription, and it is a basic, though extremely common, error to suppose that markets do not work efficiently if
they depart from the model."2'
C. Why Economically Sound Competitive Standards Are Important to Good Public Policy
Central to the deregulation of any industry are
three economic maxims. The first and most basic of
these is that regulation should be applied to entire
11 Albert L. Danielsen & David R. Kamerschen, A Methodological Study of Market Power and Market Shares in Intrastate Inter-LA TA Telecommunications, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE POST-DivESTrrURE ERA 135, 136-37 (Albert L.
Danielsen & David R. Kamerschen eds., 1986).
17
In re Application of New Jersey Bell Telephone Com-

pany for Approval of its Plan for an Alternative Form of Regulation, New Jersey Board of Regulatory Commissioners, Affidavit of Robert D. Willig, filed Mar. 30, 1992, at 2.
18 Id.
19
RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK,

ANTI-

TRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 166
(2d ed. 1981). See also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 10, at

95.
"

POSNER & EASTERBROOK,

supra note 19, at 165.

1993]

TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION

markets, not just "large" firms or market participants. The way market power should be assessed,
and hence the way regulation should be applied, can
only be determined within the context of the entire
market, its economic structure, and its participants,
including the supply side (the firms) and the demand
side (the customers). 21 Thus, a key question that
arises is: What is the overall structure of the market?
This question leads into the second maxim, which
is that regulation should only be applied to services
for which there is "market power." Market power is
usually defined in the law and economics literature
as the ability of a firm, or group of firms acting in
concert, to increase prices above competitive levels
for a significant period of time before either competitive entry or the actions of existing rivals require the
increase in price to be rescinded. 22 Regulation is required as a ceiling on the upper limits of prices for
services that are "vested in the public interest" and
for which the seller has market power.2" That these
services are imbued with the public interest is the
reason one observes standard rate base rate of return
regulation or price ceiling regulation in industries
such as telecommunications, natural gas and electric
power. The key question to answer is: Is the market
competitive (i.e., do all firms in the market for a
given service lack the ability to exercise market
power)?
The third maxim is that if a multiproduct firm
supplying its services via the use of common plant

11 DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS I
(1989).
2 The definition of market power used here is that of William Landes & Richard Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937 (1981). Similarly, the Supreme
Court has defined market power (using the terminology "monopoly power") as the power to control prices and to exclude
competitors. American Tobacco Co. et al. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 809 (1946)(interpreting monopolization power as a
power that parties are able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential competition from the field); United States v. E.I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956)("[A] party has
monopoly power if it has, over 'any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,' a power of controlling prices or
unreasonably restricting competition."). On the federal regulatory side of the fence, the FCC defines market power as the
power to control price. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates
for Competitive Common Carrier Services, FirstReport and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1980)[hereinafter First Report]. Regarding the related concept of dominant carrier status, the FCC
has used the term "dominant carrier" to designate common carriers having market power. Id. para. 56.
22
This is the public interest theory of regulation, which
states that regulation should be based on the maxim of economic
efficiency. Thus, under this standard, regulation should maximize social welfare through proper pricing and entry policies.

and investment-as would be the case in a networkbased industry such as telecommunications or electric
power generation-has market power for some subset of its services, it may have no market power in
the provision of its other services, meaning that such
remaining services do not require regulation. 2 A
market in which there is no market power is one
that can be considered subject to significant competition-in an economic, though not necessarily legal,
sense-and hence should be deregulated, or at least
made subject to reduced regulatory oversight.2 5
The implementation of sound competitive standards, and the development of pragmatic methods for
demonstrating compliance with these standards, are
very important because they comprise an integral
component in telecommunications policies necessary
for a transition to greater reliance on market forces
and less reliance on regulation. For example, competitive standards are crucial to the transition from
asymmetric regulation to deregulation of telecommunications markets, and are equally important to the
proper evaluation of state and federal policies that
mandate competitive access to network facilities, such
as collocation, expanded interconnection and unbundling. 6 Sound standards are also needed in conjunction with existing and future state laws that
classify services as "competitive" and "noncompetitive," or that proscribe cross-subsidy flows from the
"noncompetitive" service category to the other(s).2 7

Social welfare in this context refers to the joint maximization of
consumer surplus and the profits of the firms servicing the market (i.e., producer surplus). The primary goal of the public interest standard of regulation is to protect consumers against the
abuses of monopoly power. See George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971); MICHAEL
WATERSON, REGULATION OF THE FIRM AND NATURAL Mo-

NOPOLY 6-7 (1988).
24
See, e.g., Ronald Braeutigam & John Panzar, Diversification Incentives Under "Price-Based"and "Cost-Based" Regulation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 373 (1989); John C. Panzar, Technological Determinants of Firm and Industry Structure, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 3 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
21
Deregulation is the elimination of all regulatory controls
and requirements, resulting in freedom of entry and exit in service provision, complete freedom in price setting and freedom
from structural restrictions.
26
See, e.g., In re Expanded Interconnection with Local
Telephone Company Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, 6 FCC Rcd. 3259 (1991). See generally Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and
Telecommunications Policy: A Fostering of Competition on the
Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 263 (1992), 15 PULA 277 (JulyDec. 1992).
27
See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-15-106, 40-15-108
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II.

STATE STATUTES GOVERNING COMFOR
STANDARDS
PETITIVE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

In general, competitive standards in state telecommunications law are rare, but those that exist are remarkably uniform. States having these standards inMichigan,
Illinois,
Iowa,
Colorado,
clude
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and West Virginia.2 It is generally true that all the existing state statutes are based
on relevant antitrust economics, and usually they are
devoid of any unnecessary criteria that could muddy
the waters of a regulatory proceeding and obscure
important criteria like entry barriers.2"
A.

Oregon Revised Statutes

The Oregon statute governing criteria for "competitive" telecommunications services is representative of most of the other state statutes, and employs
the following criteria:
1. The extent to which services are available from alternative providers in the relevant market;
2. The extent to which the services of alternative providers
are functionally equivalent or substitutable at comparable
rates, terms and conditions;
3. Existing economic or regulatory barriers to entry;

4. Any other relevant factors deemed relevant by the
commission."

Although the majority of states that codify this type
of criteria follow the Oregon statute, Missouri and
Texas have statutes governing competitive standards
of a somewhat different nature.
Missouri Revised Statutes

B.

According to the Missouri Revised Statutes," a
service may be classified as noncompetitive (the "default" classification), transitionally competitive or
competitive. A service may be classified as transitionally competitive or competitive if it can be shown
that it is subject to sufficient competition to justify a
lesser degree of regulation, and that the lesser degree
of regulation is consistent with the protection of ratepayers and promotion of the public interest. The
transitionally competitive classification allows a company more pricing flexibility than a noncompetitive
service in the form of unrestricted pricing within
pre-specified rate bands. The competitive classification allows even greater pricing flexibility and more
waived regulatory requirements than the transitionally competitive classification.
One method for showing whether a service should
be classified as either transitionally competitive or
competitive begins with section 392.361 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. 2 Under section 392.361, a
petitioning company must show, based on "all relevant factors" specifically delineated by the Missouri
§§ 759.020, 759.030 (1991);

(West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.3381 (West Supp. 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.62 (West 1992); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 392.400.3, 392.400.5 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 63-9A-8
(Michie 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-21-02.2 (Supp. 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 759.030(5) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 49-31-1.1, 49-31-1.2, 49-31-1.3, 49-31-4 (Supp. 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.36.330 (West 1991). See also In

REV. STAT.

re Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Car-
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riers, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1 (Cal. PUC, Oct. 12,
1989), modified, Decision 90-04-031 (Cal. PUC, Apr. 11, 1990).
These are discussed in more detail in Alexander C. Larson &
Mark E. Meitzen, Recent State Legislation for Telecommunications Regulation: Brave New World, or Bad Public Utility
Law, 14 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 99 (1991), 15 PULA 433
(July-Dec. 1992).
28
See, e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-15-207, 40-15305 (West 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 13-502
(Smith-Hurd 1988); IowA CODE ANN. § 476.1 (West 1991);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 484.103b (West Supp. 1991);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.59 (West 1992); Mo. REv. STAT.
§§ 392.361, 392.370.1 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 69,
Chapter 3, Part 807 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN., § 63-9A-8
(Michie 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-21-02.1 (Supp. 1991);
OH. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 49, § 4927.03 (Page's 1992); OR.

ANALYSIS

TEX. ADMIN. CODE

tit. 16, § 23.27, 13 Tex. Reg. 1089 (1988) as amended, 17 Tex.
Reg. 7880 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-8b-3 (Michie Supp.
30 § 227a (Butterworth Supp.
1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.36.320 (West 1991); W.
VA. CODE § 24-2-3c (Michie 1992); and, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 196.195 (West Supp. 1991). See also P.E. STOFFREGEN,
DEREGULATION: A STATE-BY-STATE

(3d ed. 1990); David
Kaserman & John Mayo, Deregulation and Market Power Criteria: An Evaluation of State Level Telecommunications Policy,
in Telecommunications Deregulation:Market Power and Cost
Allocation Issues 65 (John R. Allison & Dennis L. Thomas eds.,
1990).
28 See Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 28, for an analysis of
the various state statutes governing competitive standards.
-o OR. REV. STAT. §§ 759.020, 759.030 (1991).
s
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This description of the Missouri Revised Statutes is

adapted from In the Matter of Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company's Application for Classification of Certain Services as
Transitionally Competitive, Missouri Public Service Commission, Case No. TO-93-116, Report and Order issued Dec. 29,
1992, at 4-5.
32
Mo. REV. STAT. § 392.361 (1987).
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Public Service Commission ("PSC"), that the service
is subject to sufficient competition to justify a lesser
degree of regulation. The PSC has no time limit to
reach a decision under section 392.361. Once a particular service is found to be transitionally competitive or competitive, section 392.361 permits the PSC
to classify a similar telecommunications service of
another company as transitionally competitive or
competitive by relying on the finding of fact made in
the original hearing.
A second method of arriving at the transitionally
competitive or competitive classification is codified at
section 392.370.1.33 Under this section, a petitioning
company must show: (1) that an order has been issued under section 392.361 that finds a service has
been classified as competitive or transitionally competitive; (2) that the service of the petitioning company is the same, substitutable, or equivalent to the
service classified either competitive or transitionally
competitive; and (3) that the competitive or transitionally competitive service is authorized- to be provided in the petitioning company's service territory. 4
When a petition for classification is sought under
this section, the PSC has ninety days to reach a decision under section 392.490.2 or the service becomes
transitionally competitive automatically.
33 Id. § 392.370.1.
Id.
85
The types of rate-setting flexibility allowed under the law
include banded rates, customer-specific contracts and detariffing.
8 TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 23.27, 13 Tex. Reg. 1089
(1988) as amended, 17 Tex. Reg. 7880 (1992). Until November
1992, the Texas Administrative Code listed twelve relatively demanding economic criteria for use in determining if services
were subject to significant competition, and if additional pricing
flexibility should be granted to the petitioning LEC. These
twelve criteria were: (1) the threat posed by competition to the
contribution the service provided to joint and common costs of
the LEO and to the LEC's capital investment related to the service in the geographic market in question, or if the service does
not require substantial investment and has not provided a contribution in the past, whether pricing flexibility will allow the service to provide such a contribution; (2) the number and size of
telecommunications utilities or other persons providing the same,
equivalent, or substitutable service, and the geographic areas
served by those providers; (3) the financial and technical resources of specific competitors relative to the financial and technical resources of the LEO in providing the service; (4) the market share of the LEO for the service, the market share of specific
competitors relative to the LEO's market share, and concentration ratios for the largest suppliers in the market; (5) the extent
to which the same, equivalent, or substitutable service is available; the ability of customers to obtain such alternative services at
comparable rates, terms, and conditions; and customer perceptions and knowledge regarding the availability of such alterna84

Texas Administrative Code

C.

Texas public utility law has provisions by which a
telephone company can demonstrate that some of its
services are subject to "significant competitive challenges," and therefore should be subject to greater
rate-setting flexibility.3 5 Specifically, Texas Administrative Code, Title 16, Section 23.27 (a/k/a Texas
Public Utility Commission Substantive Rule 23.27,
or "Substantive Rule") lists several economic criteria
to be used for determining whether a service is subject to "significant competitive challenge." 8 Many of
the criteria are similar to those of the statutes from
other states. The criteria are also similar to Missouri's "all relevant factors" test. Key determinants
of "significant competitive challenge" in the Texas
law include the number of other suppliers of a given
service in addition to the petitioning LEC, the extent
to which substitute service is available, and barriers
to entry or exit.37 The Substantive Rule also contains criteria that other state statutes do not, such as
whether there are any mechanisms to minimize potential anticompetitive practices or prevent the subsidization of the service in question with revenues
from regulated monopoly services, and whether the
flexible rate-setting sought would have a significant
impact on universal service.38
tive services in the geographic market in question; (6) the ability
of telecommunications utilities or other persons to make the
same, equivalent, or substitutable service readily available at
comparable rates, terms, and conditions in the geographic market in question; (7) the existence of any significant legal, economic and other barriers to the entry into or exit from the geographic market in question and all other such markets for that
service, the rate at which competitors are entering and leaving
those geographic markets for the service; (8) evidence of creamskimming strategies of competitors made possible by regulatory
decisions or policies which have raised rates above the LEO's
long run incremental costs in the market proposed by the LEC;
(9) any deterioration or diminished growth of revenues, market
share or service volumes of the LEC attributable to increasing
competition for that service and how pricing flexibility, if
granted, would mitigate or halt that deterioration or diminished
growth; (10) the relative ability of the LEO and of competitors
to make use of scale or scope economies in providing the service;
(11) the ability of the LEC to use bottleneck facilities to discriminate against competitors, and measures needed to prevent such
actions; and (12) the elasticity of demand both for all providers
and for the largest providers of the service and of substitutes for
the service, and the cross-elasticity of demand for the largest
providers of the service and of substitutes for the service. Id. See

TEx.ADMIN.

CODE tit.

16, § 23.27, 13 Tex. Reg. 1089 (1988)

as amended, 14 Tex. Reg. 2989 (1989).
37

Id.

8 Id.
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III.

EMSTANDARDS
COMPETITIVE
INON
PLOYED IN THE FCC'S ORDER
DISTANCE
LONG
TERSTATE
COMPETITION

On the federal side of the regulatory fence, the
FCC has produced a variety of orders, although its
1991 order regarding interstate long distance competition ("LD Competition Order") was based on
sound antitrust economics.3 9 The LD Competition
Order adopted further streamlining of tariff regulation of certain AT&T business services and authorized AT&T to offer services pursuant to individually
negotiated customer contracts so long as the services
were generally available to other similarly situated
customers. It also eliminated nondiscrimination reporting and annual audit requirements for these services, as well as Comparably Efficient Interconnection ("CEI") filing requirements and CEI
parameters for enhanced services that rely exclusively on basic services subject to further streamlining. The FCC ordered these regulatory changes
based on a finding that competition was sufficiently
effective for most business services.
When reviewing the business services market, the
FCC refused to accept AT&T's arguments that all
of its services should be deregulated because they
were embodied in one single relevant product market. The FCC stated that:
[T]he existence of one market does not require either that
we treat all services in that market identically for regulatory purposes, or that we find all services in that market
equally competitive before adopting regulatory changes for
one subset of services.'

Instead, in determining that the business services
market was substantially competitive, the FCC relied heavily on its finding that the business services
marketplace is characterized by substantial demand
and supply elasticities that limit AT&T's ability to
exercise market power. Specifically, the Commission
analyzed the following seven factors to arrive at its
decision.
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Demand Elasticities

A.

The FCC concluded that business customers were,
to a large degree, demand-elastic4 1 because:
1. They had the incentive and ability to evaluate available
options;"2
2. they were informed and sophisticated purchasers, soliciting bids from alternative suppliers before purchasing

telecommunications services and utilizing telecommunications consultants in choosing service;"'
3. they considered the quality of several competitors to be
44
equivalent;

4. they increasingly used multiple carriers;"5
5. name recognition and historic good will were reduced if
users are sophisticated and informed;4" and,

6. factors such as an enormous advertising budget, competitors' capital expansion and extensive negotiation
processes in changing/establishing service all indicated increased competitiveness of the market. 47

The FCC derived these conclusions from survey results and comments made by large business customers, and comments made by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") that the demand elasticity of large
business customers and their ability to substitute
their own networks is the most important factor constraining the exercise of market power.
Supply Elasticity

B.

The FCC found that the market was characterized by a high supply elasticity owing to the fact
that:
1. existing competitors have or can easily obtain additional
capacity; 48 and,
49
2. entry barriers are low.

39 In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880 (1991).
40 Id. at 5882 n.6.
"' A customer is demand-elastic if the amount of product
he/she wishes to purchase is highly responsive to the price of
that product.
"' In re Competition in the Interexchange Marketplace,

4s

supra note 39, para. 37.

49

44
45

46
47
48

Id. para. 39.
Id. para. 38.
Id. para. 40.
Id. para. 41.
Id. para. 42.
Id. para. 46.
Id. para. 43.
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The FCC needed to determine whether AT&T's
competitors had or could have quickly acquired at
reasonable cost, the capacity necessary to take away
enough business from AT&T to make monopoly
pricing unprofitable. It relied on various studies that
estimated the cost and time involved for interexchange carriers ("IXC") to carry additional traffic
and rejected studies that would have had competitors
replace virtually all of AT&T's traffic.
Pricing "Below the Cap"

C.

The FCC placed considerable weight on the fact
that AT&T consistently priced special access services
(except analog private line) below the "Basket 3"
(Business Services Basket) price cap and below upper banding limits. To the FCC, these lower-thanrequired prices gave additional support to the 50conclus'ion that business services were competitive.
Market Share

D.

Regarding market share, the FCC found that:
1. AT&T's market share, both in terms of revenues and
minutes of use, appeared to be significantly lower for business services than for other services; 58
share was more relevant than
2. AT&T's business 8market
2
overall market share;

3. AT&T's business market share appeared to be about
fifty percent, a level not incompatible with a highly competitive market; 53 and,
4. market share alone was not necessarily a reliable measure of competition."

The FCC gave only a short discussion of market
share, which included several disclaimers about the
usefulness of market share data, at least as the sole
determinant of the existence of competition. For example, the FCC stated:
While we believe that a protracted decline in market
share tends to indicate a competitive market, we agree
that market share trends can derive from a variety of faco Id. para. 49.
Id. para. 50.
5z Id. para. 51.
83
Id.
Id.
88
Id. at 5890 n.91.
81

tors and are not dispositive themselves of whether market
power exists.55

Interexchange Carrier Cost Structures

E.

With respect to claims that AT&T enjoyed a significant cost advantage due to such factors as its
more ubiquitous network, excessive distance sensitivity of LEC access tariffs, and traffic volumes that resulted in volume and term discounts through DS3s,
the FCC concluded there was no evidence that
AT&T enjoyed a significant overall cost advantage. 6
AT&T may have enjoyed cost advantages in certain
areas, such as transport, but there were other areas
where it may have been at a cost disadvantage, such
as with the High Cost Fund, Lifeline, Equal Access
Recovery cost, and some non-access-related costs (labor, pensions, maintenance).5" The Commission also
found similar or better operating margins for some
competitors, which indicated that at least some competitors did not face a higher cost structure.5 8 It was
further determined that the possibility of future
transport price changes did not enter into the evaluation of the existing market structure.5 9
Resource Disparity and Financial Strength

F.

While the FCC agreed that AT&T may have enjoyed certain advantages resulting from its size, superior resources, financial strength, and technical capabilities, such advantages did not necessarily confer
market power.8 0 The issue was not whether AT&T
had advantages, but whether any such advantages
were so great as to preclude the effective functioning
of a competitive market. 1 Indeed, the competitive
process itself is largely about trying to develop one's
own advantages, and all firms need not be equal in
all respects for this process to work. The FCC believed, and the record confirms, that competition in
business services is thriving, competitors are growing, and consumers are benefiting from these
occurrences.
Competition in Rural Areas

G.

The FCC rejected arguments that AT&T could
Id. para.
Id. para.
8 Id. para.
59 Id. para.
60 Id. para.
OI Id.
"

87

52.
53.
57.
59.
60.
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charge supracompetitive prices in rural areas where
there was no effective competition because the vast
majority of customers continue under generic, geographically averaged tariffs. 62 Moreover, there was
no evidence that AT&T Tariff No. 12 undermined
geographic rate averaging. On the contrary, many
AT&T Tariff No. 12 customers were located in
whole or in part in rural areas. 63
The FCC examined a number of factors in assessing the competitiveness of this market and did not
arrive at a single determinant or rigid set of criteria
for such an evaluation. The overriding factors it considered were supply and demand elasticities. To determine these elasticities, the FCC relied heavily on
business customer statements and surveys, and on
studies filed by AT&T and others. Other factors,
such as market share and AT&T pricing practices,
were used by the FCC as additional support for its
conclusion. The framework which the Commission
established in this review addressed the major factors
generally agreed to be relevant in such an assessment, and is consistent with the factors considered by
the courts in monopolization cases-even though, on
the surface, the courts appear to have placed greater
emphasis on market share results.

vestigation, the Commission issued an order adopting
a new effective competition standard. 66 The order
also delineated standards for rate regulation by
franchising agencies and adopted a Second Further
Notice to seek additional information on whether
''must carry" rules are needed and how they could
be tailored to survive a constitutional challenge.
On October 5, 1992, Congress voted to override a
Presidential veto and adopt the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
("the Act").67 This Act contains numerous statutory
provisions affecting all aspects of cable services, including the determination of effective competition.
Since its enactment, the FCC has initiated a number
of proceedings to implement new rules in compliance
with this Act. On April 1, 1993, the Commission issued a First Report and Order68 adopting rules
prohibiting unfair or discriminatory practices in the
sale of satellite cable and satellite broadcast programming. These rules are intended to increase competition and diversity in the multichannel video programming market, and foster development of
competition to traditional cable systems.

EMSTANDARDS
COMPETITIVE
ORDER
ON
IN
THE
FCC'S
PLOYED
CABLE TV COMPETITION

In its evaluation of what constitutes effective competition, the Commission's goal was to arrive at a
standard that would be conservative enough to ensure a complement of signals adequate to provide effective competition to the signal retransmission function of the cable system's basic tier, yet not so
conservative as to result in undue rate regulation. To
achieve this, the Commission has adopted a standard
that contains two separate structural tests. If either
of these tests is met, then the cable community is
deemed to include effective competition.

IV.

The Cable Act of 19844 ("Cable Act") permits
franchising authorities to regulate basic cable service
rates if the cable system is not subject to "effective
competition." The Cable Act also directs the FCC to
define what constitutes effective competition and requires the Commission periodically to review its regulation, taking into account technological developments. In 1985, the Commission established as its
first effective competition standard the availability of
three unduplicated over-the-air signals. In 1990, it
initiated a proceeding to reevaluate this standard because it found that the nature of basic cable service
had changed.6 5 In July of 1991, after extensive in" Id. para. 62.
63

Id.

64
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
e' Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 5 FCC Rcd. 259

(1990).
66
In re Reexamination of the Effective Competition Standard for the Regulation of Cable Television Basic Service Rates
and Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, Report and Order and Second Further Notice of

A.

1.

Effective Competition Standard of 1991

Signal Test

The first test considers how many free broadcast
signals are available in a market. 9 The greater the
number of free broadcast signals, the greater the
Proposed Rule Making, 6 FCC Rcd. 4545 (1991)[hereinafter
Effective Competition Standard].
17 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-385, §§ 3, 9, 14, 106 Stat. 1460
(1992)[hereinafter Cable Act of 19921.
68 In re Rules Adopted to Prevent Unfair or Discriminatory
Practices in the Sale of Cable Programming, First Report and
Order, in MM Dkt. No. 92-265 (1993).
6"
Effective Competition Standard, supra note 66, paras. 929.
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number of effective alternatives a consumer has to
paid, basic tier cable service. The Commission determined that the "three signal" standard was inadequate and adopted a "six signal" standard. Under
the new standard, a cable system is deemed to face
effective competition if at least six unduplicated
broadcast television signals are available over the entire cable community, although the same six signals
70
need not provide service to the entire community.
The Commission maintained its existing standard
for signal availability. 1 The Commission also evaluated if it should require a cable penetration criterion
along with the six signal standard to provide evidence of actual signal availability. It concluded that
a cable penetration rate is not a reliable indicator of
either poor off-air signal quality or of cable market
power, for several reasons. First, the demand for
cable service and the resulting penetration rate in a
given area are significantly affected by a number of
additional factors besides off-air signal quality, such
as price, quality of service, income, demographics,
age of system and varying viewing tastes. 2 Therefore, penetration levels do not always vary directly
with basic cable rates.73 Second, a penetration criterion could actually penalize those cable systems that
achieve high penetration as a result of conducting
subscriber-sensitive marketing and offering quality
service at a reasonable price.7 4 Finally, an imposed
penetration threshold could provide an incentive for
cable systems to remain under the designated penetration rate, thus artificially interfering with cable
marketing decisions.75 For these reasons, the Commission declined to adopt a penetration criterion in
conjunction with the six signal standard.
2. Multichannel Competitor Test
In communities lacking six over-the-air signals,
effective competition may also exist if another multichannel provider is present and offers multiple
channel options. The second test of the effective competition standard considers the availability of a competing, independently-owned, multichannel video delivery service in the cable community, and establishes
a benchmark that must be met to indicate effective
70

Id. para. 24.

Id. This standard is based on either predicted Grade B
contours, as defined in section 73.683 of the rules, or significantly viewed status in the cable community, pursuant to sections 76.5(i), 76.54(b) and 76.54(c) of the rules. Id.
72 Effective Competition Standard, supra note 66, para. 28.
71

competition.' Specifically, effective competition exists if an alternative system is available to at least
fifty percent of the homes that currently have cable
service available to them (regardless of whether or
not they subscribe to the incumbent service), and at
least ten percent of those homes subscribe to that alternative service. It is not necessary that the same
alternative service be available throughout the area.
The Order further details the types of providers that
are considered alternative systems and the computations required to arrive at the aforementioned
percentages.
In its analysis of the multichannel competitor test,
the Commission considered whether "potential competitors," such as a neighboring multichannel provider, should be included as an alternative to the incumbent cable system. The Commission rejected this
on grounds that, while the potential for competition
may constrain a cable system's rates in some instances, it is not clear that "potential competition"
will generally have this effect.
3.

Competitive Behavior Test

The Commission also considered, but rejected, a
competitive behavior test77 intended to identify those
markets where competitive forces not identified by
the proposed structural tests would have a price-disciplining effect on cable services. Under this test, a
cable system would have been considered subject to
effective competition if it offered a basic tier of service corresponding in rates and quantity to specified
benchmarks. The benchmarks were to be based on
cable service in areas where effective competition
was readily apparent. In addition, the cable systems
would have to have met certain customer service
standards. While the Commission favored such a test
in concept, it conceded that it could not overcome the
practical problems associated with developing an objective nationwide benchmark that would be readily
applicable on an individual community basis. Basic
service rates reflect a multitude of factors dependent
on the characteristics of the cable system and its
community, which can differ locally or from system
to system in the same area.

" Id. The FCC refers to examples listed in NTIA Comments, February 14, 1991, at 12.
7' Effective Competition Standard, supra note 66, para. 29.
75

Id.

7' Id. paras 30-43.
77 Id. paras 44-48.
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B.

Cable Act of 1992

The Cable Act of 1992 mandates regulation of
rates of basic cable services and cable programming
services if the Commission finds that a cable system
is not subject to effective competition. However, if a
cable system is subject to effective competition, then
the Act prohibits the regulation of rates." The statute provides three separate tests that establish
whether a cable system is subject to effective competition. The three tests are:
1. Fewer than thirty percent of the households in a given
franchise area subscribe to the cable service of a cable
system;

2. The franchise area is (a) served by at least two unaffiliated multichannel video programming distributors, each of
which offers comparable video programming to at least
fifty percent of the households in the franchise area, and
(b) the number of households subscribing to programming
services offered by multichannel video programming distributors other than the largest multichannel video programming distributor exceeds fifteen percent of the households in the franchise area; or
3. A multichannel video programming distributor operated by the franchising authority for that franchise area

offers video programming to at least fifty percent of the
households in that franchise area."
To comply with the Act and amend its rules accordingly, the Commission initiated a number of
proceedings. The issue of effective competition is addressed in the Rate Regulation proceeding. 0 In the
Rate Regulation notice, the Commission sought comment on how to clarify and define some of the terms
used in the Act to describe the new tests for effective
competition. Based on the information gleaned from
the comments and reply comments, an order was issued on April 1, 1993.
V.

COMPETITIVE STANDARDS AND
MARKET STRUCTURAL
CHARACTERISTICS

Most of the competitive criteria used in the state
statutes and in recent key FCC orders can be placed
into one of three specific categories: (1) nature and

78

47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2).
Communications Act of 1934, § 623(I)(1)(B),(C); 47

availability of substitute suppliers and services; (2)
economic structural market conditions emanating
from the existence of sunk costs or other economic
conditions, such as entry barriers; and, (3) consideration of relative size of market entrants with respect
to the regulated incumbent supplier(s). This section
and the following two major sections discuss the various categories outlined here, and provide an integrated discussion of the criteria comprising each category, with background material, economic analysis,
and recommendations as to how attorneys might
make pragmatic demonstrations of compliance with
the relevant criteria before a telecommunications regulatory agency.
Market Power and Market Share

A.

All state statutes governing telecommunications
competitive criteria employ the criterion of the nature and availability of substitutes to the petitioning
company's services. The FCC also relied heavily on
this criterion in recent key orders on long distance
competition and cable TV.
In general, the existence of market power is the
measure of how competitive a market is. Thus, to
the extent that this criterion in telecommunications
law could provide meaningful indicators of market
power, it would be sufficient to ensure that a service
is competitive or not. Market power is defined as the
ability of a firm (or group of firms) to raise prices
above competitive levels for a significant period of
time." Stated another way, it is the ability of a firm
or group of firms acting jointly to raise prices above
the competitive level without losing so many sales so
rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and
must be rescinded. Not surprisingly, this ties in directly to the existence of market structural characteristics such as the existence of other firms selling substitutes, and the lack of entry barriers.
Market share for a single firm is ideally defined as
the firm's sales divided by the productive capacity of
all the firms producing the same item and items that
consumers regard as reasonable substitutes.8 2 It is
usually calculated in terms of the firm's share of the
total market's sales revenues, volumes, or capacity
(in physical terms), though if the intent is to measure the supply capability of alternate suppliers, usRad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 187 (1992).
See supra note 22 and explanatory text.
81

U.S.C. § 543(I)(1)(B),(C).
"0 In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 Rate Regula-

DERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

tion, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 58 Fed. Reg. 48, 85

222 (1988).

82
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ing relative shares of capacity is best. Market share
is typically used as a proxy for market power, albeit
a strictly imperfect one. 3 Market share as a standalone indicator of market power is problematic because it provides a myopic view of the entire market,
particularly in regulated industries undergoing a
transition to competition.
Market share is but one determinant of market
power. Also required is a definition of the relevant
market, which has a product dimension and a geographic dimension. Defining the market is often a
contentious process in the courts, but one that is normally not addressed in state regulatory proceedings,
where the state and the service (plus several of its
obvious substitutes) are usually assumed to be the
"market." A "high" market share in a regulated industry undergoing a transition to competition may
mean nothing in terms of market power, since it may
be but an artifact of the past, devoid of information
concerning a regulated firm's actual ability to control
current prices. This latter point has been made in
the courts.8 4
In fact, the following three general propositions
can be stated about market power and its relation to
other industry structural considerations:
1. Market power varies directly with market share.
2. Market power varies inversely with the elasticity of the
industry demand.
3. Market power varies inversely with supply elasticity. 85

Because of the effects of market supply elasticity and
the price elasticity of demand, both of which are inversely related to market power, a "low" market
share is indicative of a lack of market power, but a
"high" market share does not necessarily indicate
that market power exists, since high market shares
can coexist with high price elasticities and supply
elasticities, both of which serve to dampen market
power. Thus, while low market shares can be dispositive of a finding of no market power, high mar85 The court in Ball Memorial recognized this: "Market
share is just a way of estimating market power, which is the
ultimate consideration. When there are better ways to estimate
market power, the court should use them. Market share reflects
current sales, but today's sales do not always indicate power over
sales and price tomorrow (citations omitted)." Ball Memorial,
784 F.2d at 1336.
8' Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v. New Vector Communications,
Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989)("Reliance on statistical
market share in cases involving regulated industries is at best a

ket shares alone do not allow a regulatory agency to
make any reliable inferences.
Analyzing the availability of substitutes is a valuable and practical criterion. The availability of substitutes, and the existence of other firms selling them
determines in large part how demand elasticity, supply elasticity, and market share will look. One is
usually unlikely to find sufficiently reliable market
share, industry elasticity, and supply elasticity data
to permit a precise estimate of market power. To be
more specific, the greater the number of substitute
services, the greater the price elasticity of demand,
and the lower the market power of a given firm operating in that market. Additionally, the greater the
number of substitute services, the greater the supply
elasticity in the market, and the lower the market
power of a given firm operating in that market.
Thus, it is wiser to rely on determinants such as the
existence of competitors, and hence of substitutes, if
one is deriving a practical rule that can actually be
implemented in an industry as complicated as telecommunications. The existence of potential competitors should be assessed when examining ease of entry, but it may be difficult to do this pragmatically.
There are quantitative measures of market power,
such as the Lerner index, 6 but these can be misleading when applied to a multiproduct firm that has
significant levels of shared costs. The simple Lerner
index, which is computed as price minus marginal
cost, divided by price, may yield misleadingly high
numbers, and hence incorrect inferences when applied to multiproduct firms. First, telephone company services often have low avoidable costs that are
directly attributable to one service, but significant
costs-both avoidable or sunk-that are shared by a
potentially large number of services. It would be economically infirm to allocate such costs to any one
particular service or market. Second, Lerner's index
uses marginal costs that include the opportunity cost
of capital, whereas telephone company cost studies
may not always include this component. Again, this
would have a tendency to make the index misleadingly high. Third, Lerner assumed that prices were
tricky enterprise and is downright folly where, as here, the predominant market share is the result of regulation. In such cases,
the court should focus directly on the regulated firm's ability to

control prices or exclude competition.").
8" These are discussed in Landes & Posner, supra note 22,
at 944-52, and in SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 82, at
220-22. A good general discussion within a case study may be
found in Danielsen & Kamerschen, supra note 16, at 147-49.
88
Abba P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934).
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In gauging whether a market is in transition to
competition, one must determine if there are substitutes to services that were provided only by a sole
supplier in the past. Thus, an important issue to
consider is when services are substitutes for each
other. Generally, the term "substitutes" in economics
is used to describe pairs of goods or services such
that an increase in the price of one product or service
causes a corresponding increase in the amount of demand for the second comparable product or service.
Stated another way, if two services have a positive
cross-elasticity of demand with respect to price, then
they can be considered substitutes.9" Services need
not be operationally identical in order to be substitutes for each other. "Operationally identical" here
means that they need not have the same method of
operation, or underlying technology to be considered
substitutes. The question of substitutes may involve a

trade-off between price and level of quality. The importance of this latter point cannot be emphasized
enough, for it gets at the very essence of what substitute services are.
If consumers have one service available to them,
and another service is perceived to be of lower quality or convenience but sells for a commensurably
lower price, then the lower quality service can very
easily be a substitute for the original service, even if
not technically identical (or even operationally
"transparent" to the user). This is so because there
are services for which the differential in quality is
compensated by the differential in price. Whether a
service is technically identical to another service, and
vice versa, completely misinterprets the issue of what
substitutes are. The real issue is whether customers
can substitute one service for another service, or use
it as a replacement, at prices they regard as comparable. Services that are not identical can still be substitutes for each other.
How does one determine if two services are substitutes? One way is by estimating the cross-elasticity
of demand between them. If the estimated cross-elasticity between two services are deemed to be positive,
then one could reasonably conclude that those two
services are substitutes." l Suppose there are two services, each sold at a given price. Assume that we alter the price of one of these services by raising it, and
then observe what happens to the quantities sold of
the second service. Given this simple exercise, a
cross-elasticity is simply the ratio of two numbers:
the percentage change in the quantity of the first service, and the percentage change in the price of the
second service. If these two services are substitutes,
then the cross-elasticity will be positive.
An examination of the "own-price" elasticity of a
service (i.e., the percentage change in the service's
own quantity divided by the percentage change in its
price), however, is not a direct test of whether it has
substitutes. The test of whether a service has any
substitutes is based on an examination of cross-elasticities, not own-elasticities. Thus, a service that has
substitutes can have an own-price elasticity of demand that is inelastic, which means that a service's

Uniform prices are a simple unit price per unit of output.
Multipart tariffs have separate prices for access to and usage of a service, such as a recurring flat monthly fee and additional fees based on the amount of usage of the service. They
may also include separate rates for time-of-day or distance of a
telephone call.
" Avoidable costs are the costs that would be saved or not
incurred if the business decision in question is not undertaken. A
sunk cost is a cost that is unavoidable in the short or "intermedi-

ate" run, even if there is a complete cessation of output. See
generally COST AND PRICING PRINCIPLES FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY 155-63 (Alexander C. Larson &
Mark E. Meitzen eds., 1990).
90 It is possible for two services to be substitutes, yet not
have a positive cross-elasticity of demand. See DAVID M. KREPS,
A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 61 (1990). In this
case, income effects outweigh substitution effects.
9' See Kreps, supra note 90, at 61.

simple uniform tariffs," though in reality telephone
company prices are often complicated multipart tariffs."8 One way around this problem would be to use
service revenues in lieu of "price" in the Lerner
formula, but then the problem of mismatching costs
arises. The problem this poses is: How does the analyst make the correct comparison of revenues to costs
when there are avoidable shared costs that cannot be
allocated to any one service or group of services in an
economically meaningful way? Other conceptual
questions arise as well. Does a regulated firm supply
its services at the cost that a competitive firm would?
Should the Lerner index be computed using only
avoidable costs, i.e., should sunk costs be excluded? 9
If lump sum charges, paid up front at the time of
service connection, are designed to recover costs that
become sunk once incurred, should they be included
in the revenues used in the Lerner index? Even in
the face of perfect data, the Lerner index may be illsuited as a measure of market power for an incumbent telecommunications supplier that is undergoing
a transition to competition.
Availability of Substitutes, Demand Elasticities,
and Cross-Price Elasticities

B.
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own-price elasticity does not allow inferences about
substitutes under economic theory. Regardless of the
own-price elasticity, the service may still have many
substitutes, or none at all.
When determining whether a service has substitutes, the elasticity of demand for that particular service is not as useful as the relevant cross-elasticity
with respect to another service, both in theory and in
practice. Yet, this very fact is often a cause of confusion for non-economists. The logic behind the use of
demand elasticities is that if a service has a "high"
elasticity, it is due to the competitive forces being exerted on the product in question, i.e., the availability
of substitutes combined with spirited price competition creates the high elasticity. While this may be
true, it is also true that a high elasticity may indicate
that a service is being priced at monopoly levels,
since a true, unregulated monopolist with complete
control of its market will always set prices in the
elastic region of a demand curve when it is maximizing profits. Thus, a study that indicates an elastic
demand elasticity-one that is greater than one, in
absolute value-may be inconclusive and should not
comprise a stand-alone indicator of competition.
The power to control price, and therefore exercise
or maintain market power, requires a low own-price
elasticity of demand. A low estimated own-price
elasticity can serve as partial support for inferences
of market power, because market power is power
over price, and a low own-elasticity means that relatively few sales would be lost if prices were increased. A low estimated own-elasticity-for instance, one that is practically zero--for an incumbent
firm undergoing transition to a competitive market,
however, is not necessarily an indicator of conditions
that somehow are inimical to the public interest (i.e.,
where customers are "captive ratepayers" with no
alternative sources of supply). For example, the
price elasticity of demand for basic local exchange
service has been estimated econometrically as being
practically zero, ranging from -.01 to -.04. These are
extremely inelastic numbers.92 What does this say
about basic local exchange service, perhaps the most
stringently monitored and regulated service in telecommunications? It means that regulation of the
prices for this service has succeeded in stemming any

market power that a telephone company might have
been able to exercise if regulation was absent. The
lower the price, the lower the price elasticity of demand. Since regulation has kept basic local exchange
rates quite low for many years, the low elasticity is
likely the result of market power not being present,
due to regulatory pricing policies designed to maintain universal service. Thus, a "low" own-elasticity
may signify one of two states of affairs: that regulation has constrained market power, or that the regulatory constraint is too liberal to have constrained
market power. In other words, it may tell the investigator very little.
While econometrics 93 has revolutionized the estimation of demand elasticities over the past two decades, it is not always easy to measure own-price
elasticities of demand with a high degree of statistical
precision. In telecommunications and in other industries, price elasticities are measured using sophisticated and expensive econometric models. These models often require a great deal of time series data,
which are data measured over uniform discrete periods of time, and cross-sectional data, which are data
regarding geographic units such as states. Even with
these data, econometric modeling results in estimates
of some degree of precision, but never absolutely precise numbers. Although econometric methods are
sound statistical methods of estimating price elasticities, they cannot guarantee that such estimates have
variances close enough to zero to afford sufficient
statistical precision. Most telephone companies have
a relative dearth of information on price elasticities
of their services, with intraLATA toll and residence
basic local exchange service being those typically
found to exist.
In interpreting own-price elasticities for purposes
of regulatory proceedings, it is important to distinguish between the concepts of firm elasticity and
market elasticity. If elasticities are considered important as a demonstration of market power, then firm
elasticities are what should be examined. This is the
demand curve an individual firm faces in selling its
products. The market elasticity corresponds to the
overall market demand for a product, and charts
how much total demand there is across all firms for
a given price.94

See, e.g., J. Bodnar, P. Dilworth & S. Iacono, Cross-Sec-

93 Econometrics is the quantification of economic relationships using economic theory and a variety of advanced statistical
and mathematical tools.

2

tional Analysis of Residential Telephone Subscription in Canada, 3 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 359 (1988); L.D. Taylor & D.
Kridel, Residential Demand for Access to the Telephone Network, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND MODELLING: AN
INTEGRATED VIEW

105 (Alain De Fontenay, Mary H. Shugard

& David S. Sibley eds., 1990).

98

See

CARLTON

&

PERLOFF,

supra note 10, at 78-82;

David Scheffman, Statistical Measures of Market Power: Uses
and Abuses, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 901, 914-17 (1992).
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Given this distinction, what should one expect to
see if elasticities are computed for telecommunications services that are arguably "competitive"? Note
that firm elasticities are higher than market elasticities, and in fact, can be several times that of the market demand elasticity. Firm elasticities are more important than market elasticities as a piece to the
puzzle of competitiveness, and highly elastic firm
elasticity is not unusual. If a petitioning LEC's estimated firm price elasticity in a given market is less
than one-and therefore inelastic in absolute
value-should it be concluded that the LEC actually
retains market power and that the market is not yet
competitive for purposes of public policy? The answer, of course, is No.
The reason this answer is No becomes apparent
when one recognizes that econometrics is normally
used in the estimation of demand elasticities. What
will econometric demand elasticity estimates look
like if the firm for which they are estimated has had
a consistently high market share for the entire period
in which the demand and price data were collected?
Such estimates should look quite low for firm elasticities; too low, in fact, to be firm elasticities in the
first place. This is because the "firm" at one time
was in large part the "market." This leads to the
expected result of relatively low firm elasticities
when examining firms that at one time were regulated monopolies, but are currently undergoing a
transition to competition. Thus, low estimated ownprice elasticities may not yield inferences as to market power on a forward-looking basis for a firm that
historically had a large share of the market due to
regulation.
As discussed, examining own-price elasticities is
not likely to be helpful in making a determination of
market power. The essence of having competitive
choices of products is substitutability between products, and so cross-elasticities are more useful than
own-price elasticities, though in practice they, too,
are difficult to apply. In theory, cross-elasticities are
used to determine when products are substitutes for
each other and what products or services should be
included in a market definition before market shares
can be computed. In practice, it can be difficult to
compute these numbers with statistical reliability.
There are as well conceptual problems and poten" See generally Klaus Stegemann, Cross Elasticity and the
Relevant Market, 11 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTS UND
SOCIALWISSENSCHAFTEN 151 (1974).
"' This situation is often referred to as the "Cellophane fallacy," which was committed by the Supreme Court in U.S. v.
E.1. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). See

tial problems in properly interpreting cross-elasticities. 5 For example, a high cross-elasticity between
two services may mean that they are substitutes; it
may also mean that one of the services is already
priced at monopoly levels, which yields the high
cross-elasticity.9" In addition, while a positive crosselasticity indicates that services are substitutes, a
negative cross-elasticity does not mean that they are
not substitutes. Further, if the services involved are
sold in greatly differing quantities-which would
most likely be the case for a regulated monopoly undergoing transition to what may currently be a
highly competitive market-then what is actually a
very high degree of substitutability may appear to be
a prima facie low degree because the resulting crosselasticity computation is low. 97 One could easily get

a low estimated cross-elasticity for a regulated firm's
cross-elasticity with respect to the service offered by
one of its competitors, and erroneously conclude that
the two services are not close substitutes, when in
fact they are.
While cross-elasticities are more relevant to an examination of market power than own-elasticities,
they are not free of interpretational problems. Even
if data were perfect and plentiful, it may be difficult
to know what an estimated cross-elasticity is indicating purely on its face. For this reason, it may be best
to use econometric estimates of cross-elasticities if
they are available, test them to see if they are statistically significant," and combine them with other information regarding the substitutability of alternate
services. This other information can be derived from
several sources, including market survey data of customers and compilations of all the services that perform the same function at reasonably commensurable
prices.
VI.

ECONOMIC

STRUCTURAL

CONDI-

TIONS OF THE MARKET
A.

Scale and Scope Economies

No state statute or FCC order has listed scale and
scope economies as criteria for determining competition, though the Texas Administrative Code did list
these until a recent rewrite of the law.9 Even so, the
existing state statutes may have assumed that these
& HARRISON, supra note 82, at 222-23 for a brief
discussion of this.
9 SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 82, at 223.
s That is to say, perform a one-sided parametric statistical
test to see if the cross-elasticity is greater than zero.
" The repealed Texas criteria were: "the relative ability of
SULLIVAN
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criteria are included implicitly under the criterion of
entry barrier analysis, since some analysts consider
scale or scope economies to be entry barriers. Thus,
this section discusses the characteristics, and policy
implications of scale and scope economies.
1. What Are Scale and Scope Economies?
Before this section can proceed with a discussion
of scale and scope economies, and what they offer
toward inferences on competition, it is first necessary
to define some key costing concepts.
Incremental cost of a service is the additional cost
to the firm of supplying that service. It includes a
service's volume-sensitive costs and any avoidable
service-specific fixed costs associated with the provision of that service. It excludes costs directly attributable to the production of other services, and certain
unattributable costs which (1) are incurred in common for some subset of the services supplied by the
firm, and (2) cannot be avoided if the level of output
is altered or terminated. Incremental cost is relevant
to business decisions-addition of a service, expansion of the output level of a service, cessation of a
service-only on a forward-looking basis. In fact,
this is the only way one can view costs as having any
meaning from the standpoint of economic analysis of
business decision-making.1 00
Average incremental cost for a given output level
is the total incremental cost of that entire output
level, as distinguished from the "last unit of output,"
divided by that output level. Similarly, a service has
declining average incremental costs if its average incremental cost falls with increasing output levels.
There are scale economies specific to a single service if that service's average incremental cost divided
the LEO and of competitors to make use of scale or scope economies in providing the service;" TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16,
§ 23.27, 13 Tex. Reg. 1089 (1988) as amended, 14 Tex. Reg.
2989 (1989). These criteria were repealed in November 1992.
100
Economics Nobel Laureate Sir Ronald Coase's analysis
of costs and prices says it all:
Almost all economists would agree, I think, that it is desirable that prices should in general cover costs. Further,
most economists would agree that the costs are a marginal, additional, or incremental concept; that this is the
only sense in which you can talk about costs; and that
there really cannot be in a strict sense a category of fixed
costs. Again, I think most economists would agree that the
costs which are relevant for pricing are current or future
costs, and that the so-called historical costs can be ignored.
A final point on which most agree is that the allocation of
joint or common costs between products or services for the
purpose of determining prices is without meaning. This
does not mean that it is impossible to discuss the question

by its marginal cost is greater than one.
Economies of scope occur when a firm is able to
generate efficiencies from producing several products.
For example, in the two-product case, economies of
scope would exist if, for given amounts of the two
products, it is cheaper for one firm to produce the
products than it is for two different single-product
firms, i.e., stand-alone firms, to produce the products
separately. In other words, the joint costs of production are less than the stand-alone costs of production
when economies of scope exist.
What Do Scale and Scope Economies Indicate?

2.

Taken at face value, scale and scope economies offer very little assistance when one is attempting to
determine if a service is subject to significant competition. At one time, it was thought that scale economies were sufficient cost conditions to produce natural monopoly.' 0 ' Scale economies were considered an
entry barrier in the Bainsian tradition. 2 Modern
economic theory, however, indicates quite clearly
that the existence of scale or scope economies in and
of themselves provide no inferences as to whether
natural monopoly conditions exist for a multiproduct
firm. Further, the modern theories on entry barrier
analysis, discussed infra, indicate that the concept of
sunk costs is most important to the question of entry
barriers, not scale or scope economies. Thus, an examination of scale or scope economies alone is not
likely to be helpful in determining if a given service
is subject to significant competition. If these cost conditions were present in a LEC, it would indicate that
other firms would find it potentially quite difficult to
compete with that LEC. This difficulty would stem,
however, from productive efficiencies that benefit
of how the total expenses of an enterprise ought to be
defrayed. Nor does it mean that cost conditions play no
part in determining the answer to this question.

R.H. Coase, The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Application, 1 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 113, 121-22 (1970).
This is true of firms producing and selling just one product, but it is not true for multiproduct firms. The condition of
10'

scale economies was considered the necessary condition for natural monopoly for multiproduct firms until the pathbreaking pa-

per of economist William Baumol. William J. Baumol, On the
Proper Cost Tests for NaturalMonopoly in a Multiproduct Industry, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 809 (1977). Essentially this paper
developed the concept of "subadditivity" as the basis of natural

monopoly, which may have little to do with scale economies in
the multiproduct context.
102
This refers to the original economic research on entry

barriers by Joe S. Bain, who considered scale economies to be an
important entry barrier.

BAIN,

infra note 113.
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consumers via lower prices. In other words, if scale
and scope economies precluded other firms from participating in the market, customers are likely to be
benefited more than if the market were served by a
proliferation of firms.
3. Natural Monopoly, Scale Economies, and Scope
Economies
Economic theory tells us that the existence of scale
and scope economies together do not imply the cost
conditions required for natural monopoly.' 03 Natural
monopoly occurs when a single firm is the most efficient provider for the output of an entire market.
The core concept of interest is subadditivity and the
cost conditions that can produce it, not scale economies, as was thought to be the relevant cost condition
prior to Baumol's path-breaking paper in 1977."0 If
the cost of a group of services is subadditive, then the
output levels of that group of services can be produced more cheaply by a single firm than by any
group of two or more firms. Given this, an industry
is said to be a natural monopoly if the costs for the
services comprising that industry are subadditive
over the entire relevant range of output. In light of
this latter point, economic theory offers us several
seemingly confusing, interrelated facts about scope
economies, scale economies, decreasing average incremental costs, and their implications for subadditivity.
First, economies of scale are neither necessary nor
sufficient for subadditivity or natural monopoly. Second, economies of scale and economies of scope together still do not suffice for subadditivity, and so an
examination of these concepts cannot tell us if we are
dealing with a natural monopoly. Third, the concept
of decreasing average incremental costs up to and including a given product-specific level of output for
each product in a given product grouping, combined
with economies of scope at those same levels of output, implies that costs are subadditive. Fourth, while
there exists no logical connection between economies
of scale and subadditivity for the multiproduct firm,
economies of scope must be present if costs are
subadditive. Note, however, that scope economies
alone do not imply subadditivity.
As evinced by the above discussion, it is not clear
what would be gained from even a perfect knowledge of scale and scope economies. Suppose a LEC
Panzar, Technological Determinantsof Firm and Industry Structure, supra note 24, at 26.
103

104

Baumol, supra note 101.
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This discussion is adapted in part from Larson & Mudd,
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had scope economies? Most telephone companies do,
though it is difficult to measure the extent to which
they exist. What would this mean in the determination of whether a market was competitive? Certainly, if a LEO has scope economies and other,
smaller firms do not, it may make it impossible for
such firms to compete on the merits with the LEC.
In general, there is nothing anticompetitive about
this, for it is simply the fact that the incumbent LEC
may legitimately be more efficient than its competitors, and these superior efficiencies may arise from
scope economies. If this is so, it may be that no competitors are observed for services for which a LEC
can effectively harness its scope economies. Certainly, one cannot conclude that a LEC has some
"unfair" advantage if it boasts scope economies, but
smaller competitors do not. Thus, looking at this
type of indicator reveals little about whether a
proliferation of firms could actually improve the
public interest via increases in productive efficiency.
Costs and Market Structure

4.

This section knits together the interplay of costs,
demand conditions and industry structure, and indicates why these concepts are important in evaluating
whether a market is competitive.'0 5 To have a complete understanding of market structure and how it
affects public policy, it is absolutely imperative to
understand that market structure is determined, for
the most part, by the interactions between the determinants of firm size and the size of the market. The
former is determined by the cost conditions of the
firm(s) servicing the market, but the latter is determined by market demand conditions, or customers'
"willingness to pay," as it is often called. The interaction of these two determinants places parameters
on the structure of the industry, i.e., limits on the
number and the size distribution of firms likely to be
observed in the industry.'0 6
Given technological cost conditions and market demand conditions, then, a market is structurally competitive if a "large" number of firms servicing the
market leads to a division of output that yields the
lowest possible total industry costs. This likely will
be the case if there are many firms, all of which have
"low" minimum efficient scale, i.e., their respective
scale economies are exhausted at relatively low levels
supra note 26, at 284-87.
106

at 33.

See Panzar, Technological Determinants, supra note 24,
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of output. Similarly, a structural natural monopoly
exists when one firm servicing the market yields the
lowest possible total industry costs. In between these
two extremes, it is possible that only an oligopoly
can lead to total industry cost minimization.
The most basic economic rationale for the regulation of the prices of a multiproduct firm is the existence of natural monopoly. A market consisting of
only a single provider is the most efficient industry
structure. As such, it is not necessarily objectionable
from a public policy standpoint, but such single firm
supply can result in monopolistic pricing. In this
case, the role of regulation is to permit the most efficient industry structure, while regulating prices in
such a way as to simulate the economic outcome of a
competitive market, if competition were feasible.
Thus, natural monopoly cost conditions are not economically objectionable. It is the monopoly pricing
itself that is economically wasteful, not the cost conditions that permitted it.
To summarize what the above discussion offers to
policymakers, a lack of proliferation of alternate suppliers does not necessarily mean that the public interest is being harmed. Whether any market can be
"competitive" in a way that truly benefits consumers, i.e., enhances economic welfare, depends in large
part on the cost characteristics of the firms available
to serve that market. If there are many firms available to serve a market, and all such firms have low
minimum efficient scale, then total industry demand
can be supplied most efficiently by a competitive
market structure. If, however, total industry demand
can be served most efficiently by one firm, or a
"small" number of firms, then expecting a proliferation of firms to somehow emerge and benefit consumers through lower prices is economic naivet6. In
such a case, a preclusion of "competition"-defined
here as a simple proliferation of alternate suppliers-does not harm the public interest, though in the
presence of entry barriers, telecommunications utility
regulation in the form of price-ceiling regulation
may have to be maintained to prevent monopoly

pricing.

This generic discussion of entry barriers has been
107
adapted in part from Alexander C. Larson & Terrence J.

The laws governing competitive criteria seek to answer somewhat the reverse of this question: Does a regulated firm that
once was presumed to possess market power in certain markets
still, in fact, possess that market power in those same markets?
Thus, the power of entry barrier analysis in merger cases carries
over to the questions the laws governing competitive criteria
were designed to address. See generallyU.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992), reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1
13,104 [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
In fact, several recent court decisions have held that market
share data are not a sole indicator of market power and that

Schroepfer, New Telecommunications Technologies and Regulation: The Case of Personal Communications Services, 6 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 271, 286-90 (1991).
108
The parallel between merger analysis and the purpose of
the laws governing competitive criteria is obvious. A merger case
involves the potential for market power of a merged firm, where
no market power is possessed individually by the firms comprising the proposed merger. The fundamental question is, will two
or more firms (which do not possess market power) combine to
form a larger firm that does have market power?

B.

Entry Barrier Analysis

Like the criterion of the availability of substitutes,
the criterion of entry barriers also appears in all
state statutes governing telecommunications competitive standards, and it also plays a key role in the
FCC's order on interstate long distance competition.
This criterion easily is among the more important
and useful concepts in the analysis of market
power.107 It generally is true that if there are significant barriers to entry, a de facto monopoly may exist
that would result in the ability of a firm to exert
market power. Entry barriers are a necessary condition for market power, as they allow a firm to block
or deter other firms from entering the market while
the incumbent raises prices above competitive levels.
Market power can be said to exist only if barriers to
entry are substantial enough to allow the incumbent
firm unfettered control over prices.
On the other hand, if entry barriers are minimal,
i.e., there is "ease of entry," then the threat of entry
inhibits any exercise of market power. In the context
of telecommunications law, an examination of "ease
of entry" is likely to be important for a number of
reasons, most compelling of which is that if entry
into the market is facile, deregulation may be in
order.
The possibility of deregulation depends as well on
the state of the market at the point when entry barriers are raised, and the demand side of the market.
The key underlying issue remains whether there are
likely to be entry barriers to the market of interest,
and if so, whether these barriers allow the maintenance or exercise of market power. Absent considerations of market power, entry barriers in and of
themselves are not necessarily inimical to the public
interest, nor relevant to public policy issues.
It is notable that in antitrust law, entry barrier
analysis is now considered a powerful tool in merger
controversies and in predatory pricing cases.1 08 The
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courts, the Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission have made the examination of
entry barriers a fundamental and potentially dispositive step in the evaluation of mergers." 9 Ease of entry can also determine the outcome of monopolization cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act, and
rule of reason cases under section 1. 0 Thus, when

"ease of entry" is shown for a given market, it has
important ramifications for the regulatory handling
of such a market. It is a strong indicator that market
power is absent, and that the market could be
deregulated.
1.

What Conditions Constitute Ease of Entry?

For a given telecommunications market, what constitutes the conditions for ease of entry? Unfortunately, the courts have not offered consistent guidance as to what is and what is not an entry barrier.
Further, those courts that have wisely chosen to give
considerable weight to the criterion of entry barriers
have not always adhered to sound economic principles."' To confound things a bit further, the economics literature seems at first glance to offer an embarrassment of riches on entry barriers." 2
Economists over the last thirty-five years have dissuch consideration is subordinate to ease of entry considerations.
Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Industries, Inc., 1991 WL
105488 (10th Cir.(N.M.)); United States v. Syufy Enter., 903
F.2d 659, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1990)(Quackenbush, concurring);
California v. American Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 842-43 (9th
Cir. 1989); Oahu Gas Service, Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., 838
F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir. 1988); Int'l Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh
Trucking Co., Inc., 812 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1987); Energex
Lighting Indus., Inc. v. North American Philips Lighting Corp.,
765 F.Supp. 93, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Air Passenger
Computer Reservations Systems Antitrust Litigation, 694
F.Supp. 1443, 1460 (C.D.Cal. 1988); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 693 F.Supp. 262, 278
(E.D.Pa. 1988); McCaw Personal Communications, Inc. v Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F.Supp. 1166, 1174 (N.D.Cal. 1986).
Further, the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission relied on
ease of entry in its definition of a competitive market: "[W]e find
that a market is competitive when the following factors are present: there is entry and exit in the marketplace; mobile capital
exists; viable alternatives exist that satisfy the same customer
needs; and small changes in price prompt customers to switch to
other alternatives." In re Customer-Specific Offerings of Indiana
Telephone Companies Pursuant to I.C. 8-1-2.6, et seq., 107
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 366, 371 (Ind. URC, Oct. 4, 1989).
109
Merger Guidelines, supra note 108, at § 3.0.
110 Janusz A. Ordover & Daniel M. Wall, Proving Entry
Barriers:A PracticalGuide to the Economics of New Entry, 2
ANTITRUST 12, 12 (1988).
M' See Larson & Schroepfer, supra note 107, at 287 n.38,
for examples of market conditions that the courts have consid-

[Vol. 1

agreed on the true definition of barriers to entry,
though all definitions focus on cost differentials between incumbent firms in the market and prospective
entrants.
The first work in this area was completed in 1956
by Bain, who specified three sources of entry barriers: absolute cost advantages of incumbent firms,
economies of scale, and product differentiation advantages of incumbent firms." 3 In general, Bain defined entry barriers as those things which in the long
run allow an incumbent firm to charge supracompetitive or monopoly prices without inducing new
entry.
The next important definition of entry barriers
was derived by Stigler in 1968, who took a more
narrow view by arguing that the definition should
center on only those factors that give the incumbent
firm a long-term differential in production costs.
Stigler's definition asserted that an entry barrier is a
cost of production for an entrant that is not incurred
by already established firms."' Stigler argued that
the only barriers that antitrust law should care about
are advantages of incumbency which result in longterm cost differentials in production costs. Any such
advantage allows the incumbent firm to raise prices
above marginal costs without attracting entrants to
the market. The classic Stiglerian entry barrier conered entry barriers (e.g., the amount of capital necessary to become a competitor in the market, the availability of capital and
technological advancements, the number and size of firms already operating in marketplace, the structure and nature of the
industry, trade secrets, patents, licenses, the existence of excess
capacity by existing sellers, pricing elasticity, the difficulties that
buyers may have in changing suppliers, advertising, the level of
employee skill required for firm to be in a market successfully,
the costs and delays imposed by the regulatory process, insurance
costs, lengths of contracts, performance bond requirement, experience requirements and other bid specification requirements).
... See, e.g., Ioannis N. Kessides, Advertising, Sunk Costs,
and Barriers to Entry, 68 REV. ECON. & STAT. 84 (1986); John
T. Wenders, Excess Capacity as a Barrier to Entry, 19 J. IND.
ECON. 14 (1971); William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig,
Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers and Sustainability of
Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405 (1981); Richard Schmalensee,
Brand Loyalty and Barriers to Entry, 40 S. ECON. J. 579
(1974); A. Michael Spence, Notes on Advertising, Economies of
Scale, and Entry Barriers, 95 Q.J. ECON. 493 (1980); Yale
Brozen, Is Advertising a Barrier to Entry?, in ADVERTISING
AND SOCIETY 79 (1974); Harold Demsetz, Accounting for Advertising as a Barrier to Entry, 52 J. Bus. 345 (1979); Richard
Schmalensee, Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 1228 (1981); Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton,
Contracts as Barriersto Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987).
11
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sists of absolute cost and demand advantages enjoyed
by the incumbent firm."'
A more recent and economically refined definition
of entry barriers, which extends Stigler's basis to
consider the concept of economic welfare and the effects entry barriers can have on it, is one developed
by von Weizs~icker: "A barrier to entry is a cost of
producing which must be borne by a firm which
seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms
already in the industry and which implies a distortion in the allocation of resources from the social
point of view." 1 ' The von Weizsicker definition of
entry barriers is, essentially, a production cost borne
by entrants but not incumbents, which results in social welfare losses, i.e., socially inefficient outcomes.
Practically applied, then, this definition indicates
that not every requirement of producing, distributing, or marketing a product that imposes differential
costs on entrants should be properly considered an
entry barrier.' 1 For example, a firm that develops a
cost-reducing innovation not available to entrants
may appear to enjoy an entry barrier. Indeed, in the
standard Bainsian analysis of entry barriers, it
would. Yet because cost reductions can benefit consumer welfare in the form of lower prices, engaging
in cost-reducing innovation does not raise Sentry barriers in the von Weizslicker framework.
Von Weizsicker's analytic framework is important to competitive standards for the following reasons. First, von Weizsacker's rigorous mathematical
economics approach showed that barriers to entry, as
defined by Stigler, cannot be shown to lead, as a
mathematical theorem, to economic inefficiencies
under all circumstances. Given this, he suggested two
ways of handling the concept of entry barriers: either
adhere to the Stiglerian definition and be careful not
to draw any welfare and policy conclusions from it,
or revise the definition and require the existence of
certain inefficiencies as an attribute of entry barriers.
Since the first alternative holds little value, his seminal paper handles the second of these alternatives.
Second, using his revised definition of entry barri-

ers, which incorporates welfare effects, von Weizsicker showed that Bainsian entry barriers do not always conform to his definition. Essentially, the
Bainsian and Stiglerian entry barrier definitions assume that entry barriers will lead to economically
inefficient markets. Conversely, the definition derived
by von Weizsicker implicitly performs a more penetrating analysis by showing that some economic conditions formerly considered entry barriers, and hence
automatically assumed to lead to allocative distortions or other economic inefficiencies, are not always
inefficient when welfare effects are examined. The
von Weizsacker definition of entry barriers itself is
not perfect,"' but the philosophy behind it-that the
social gains from alternative feasible government actions are important to public policy decisions-has
important implications for discussing laws governing
telecommunications competitive criteria.
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view). See also W. KiP VIscUsI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH
E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 160 (1992)(maintaining that von Weizsicker's definition
of entry barriers is the best motivated, but like the Bainsian defi-
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The Role of Sunk Costs in Modern Conceptual
Entry BarrierAnalysis

2.

A sunk cost is a cost that is unavoidable in the
short or "intermediate" run, even if there is a complete cessation of output. 2 Recognizing the importance of sunk costs has great influence on what is
and what is not considered an entry barrier. This
section discusses the role of sunk costs in the pragmatic use of the entry barrier concept when analyzing market power.
It stands to reason that some production costs imposed on entrants, but not incumbents, are likely to
be non-recoverable, market-specific costs that are
sunk when incurred. Because the prospective entrant
must incur sunk costs to become an established firm,
some economists have considered sunk costs as an entry barrier. 2 ' In the analysis by Baumol and Willig,
for example, sunk costs are viewed by prospective
entrants as incremental to the decision to enter the
market. These costs are therefore an incremental
cost, with corresponding incremental risk, which
must be recovered with post-entry revenues by en-

nition, it defines an entry barrier by a particular outcome).
120
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trants. The incumbent firm does not take these costs
into consideration in assessing its prospective business decisions.' 22 Sunk costs are also a primary entry
barrier in the theory of contestable markets developed by Baumol, Panzar and Willig. 2 '
To what extent are sunk costs, which are potentially pervasive in a network industry like telecommunications, relevant to the question of ease of entry? This Article considers sunk costs to be relevant
to the question of entry barriers, but does not consider just any non-zero amount of sunk costs to be an
entry barrier, as the pure theory of costless entry put
forth by Baumol, Panzar and Willig would require.
Instead, if entry requires the incurrence of capital
costs, and a "high" proportion of these are sunk costs
for entrants, then entry barriers exist. This merging
of the concepts of sunk costs and entry barriers is not
inconsistent with the von Weizsicker definition of
entry barriers.
An investigator must ask: Are prospective suppliers for a given telecommunications market required
to incur significant sunk costs of entry? If capital
costs are required for entry, and a "high" proportion
of them are expected to be sunk, what implications
should such conditions have for public policy? These
questions are basic to an examination of entry barriers for determining if a given market is subject to
significant competition. This is because once sunk investment has been incurred, it has zero opportunity
cost, and hence is not part of the costs of the firm's
alternatives, since such investment cannot be put to
alternative use. The high proportions of sunk costs
are no longer part of the forward-looking expenses
of the incumbent firm, whereas the prospective entrant, in deciding whether to enter the market, must
consider it an outlay. Sunk costs are costs that cannot
be recovered if entry fails. For this reason, high proportions of sunk costs can create significant asymmetries between incumbent firms and new entrants,

thereby rendering the market noncompetitive. 2 4
Hence, if new entrants must incur "large" proportions of sunk costs to enter the market, then a continuation of regulation may be required. The issue is
whether there is an expectation of market power for
one or more firms in the prospective market due to
these proportions of sunk costs.

Contestable markets theory suggests that scale economies

William G. Shepherd, "Contestability" vs. Competition, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 572, 577 (1984). The reference to Spence in this

22

and fixed costs are not barriers to entry. According to the theory,
the productive technology is available to potential entrants, a sit-

uation that exists in many telecommunications markets. In the
absence of sunk costs, firms may enter markets in which profit
opportunities exist. See generally BAUMOL, PANZAR & WILLIG,
supra note 120, at 282-301; SPULBER, supra note 21, at 40-42.
However, as Shepherd has pointed out:
virtually all production requires specific assets which cannot be transferred or sold costlessly. This applies to physical equipment, advertising, R & D, expert skills, and the
other commitments needed to establish entry. Fixed and
sunk costs commonly overlap and are sizeable, as Spence

(1983) and others note. Zero sunk cost is therefore a
doubtful, counterfactual assumption for a general theory.

The Role of Economies of Scale and Scope in
Entry Barrier Analysis

3.

Since many telecommunications services are offered via a network involving common plant and investment, scope economies will exist for many of the
sets of services offered by LECs. One could also expect to see service-specific scale economies, though
their existence would not necessarily be caused by
the existence of common plant. This means that
LECs may be extremely cost efficient in serving various markets, which in the long run could stimulate
infrastructure development, encourage the diffusion
of advanced technologies, and benefit consumers with
low prices.
The key question is: Are scale and scope economies entry barriers that can harm competition? Scale
economies are one of the classic Bainsian entry barriers, and though Bain did not discuss scope economies specifically, they would be an entry barrier in
the Bainsian tradition. 25 In contrast, when one
adopts the more advanced entry barrier definition of
von Weizsicker and recognizes the true role of sunk
costs, scale and scope economies in and of themselves
are not entry barriers. Under some circumstances,
scale and scope economies may exacerbate sunk costs
as entry barriers. Productive efficiency borne of
scope economies does not constitute an entry barrier
even if such efficiencies make it challenging for en-

quote is A. Michael Spence, Contestable Markets and the The-

ory of Industry Structure: A Review Article, 21 J. EcoN. LIT.
981 (1983)(book review).
123 BAUMOL, PANZAR & WILLIG, supra note 120, at 290-92.
Stiglerian entry barriers are inconsistent with a perfectly contestable market.
124
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The concept of scope economies was first introduced to
the literature in 1975 by John C. Panzar and Robert D. Willig,
long after Professor Bain's death. See Panzar, Technological Determinants, supra note 24, at 16 n.11.
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trants to compete with incumbents. 2 '
Again, scale or scope economies in and of themselves are not entry barriers. This conclusion can be
further drawn out by considering the minimum conditions necessary for entry. Minimum viable scale
("MVS") is the amount of total sales at a given price
that a new entrant would need, at a minimum, to
post profits large enough to make entry viable. Economic cost conditions like scale and scope economies
are often considered entry barriers only if MVS is
high. Thus, it is high MVS combined with scale or
scope economies and sunk costs that is often contended to be an entry barrier. While scale and scope
economies, in conjunction with high MVS and the
requirement that new entrants incur substantial proportions of sunk costs, may be a formidable barrier
to entry, it is the sunk costs themselves that are the
entry barrier. The scale and scope economies merely
exacerbate the sunk cost requirement and, in the absence of sunk costs, would be irrelevant to the entry
barrier question, which itself would be irrelevant if
allow firms to create or maintain
it does nothing to
7
market power.

4.

1

Summary and Recommendations on Entry
Barriers

The determination of entry barriers is not a hard
science. Perhaps the advice of Viscusi, Vernon, and
Harrington explains this economic fact of life best:
IS]ome economists and antitrust lawyers throw the term
entry barrier around like there is one accepted and meaningful definition when there is not. The best advice we
can offer is to perform a two-stage inquiry. In the first
stage, carefully examine the assumptions underlying the
particular argument that something is a barrier. Determine whether it is indeed true that existing firms can
maintain price above [economic] cost while deterring entry. In the second stage, consider whether there is a policy
that could 'remove' the barrier and improve social
welfare. 128

Despite the fact that entry barrier analysis is not
an exact science, a reliance on the economics literature still offers several practical guideposts for the
use, and avoidance of misuse, of the entry barrier
126
Even if incumbent firms enjoyed absolute cost advantages
that precluded entry, regulation is not justified if the cost advantage is due to productive efficiency. SPULBER, supra note 21, at
42.
'27 Interestingly, the validity of sunk costs (or large proportions thereof) as an entry barrier is what makes Bainsian entry
barriers like scale economies and scope economies a moot issue.
If MVS is high due to the existence of scale or scope economies,

criterion when demonstrating compliance with telecommunications law governing competitive standards. First, scale and scope economies need not be
entry barriers, and in fact, in and of themselves
should not be considered as such. As this Article
points out, the underlying entry barrier is the requirement that entrants incur significant portions of
sunk costs. While the existence of scale and scope
economies may exacerbate the role that sunk costs
play as an entry barrier (by making MVS high), it
is the sunk costs that are the entry barriers, not the
scale or scope economies.' 29
Second, perhaps the worst thing to require as a
demonstration of compliance is some sort of entry
barrier "laundry list" that contains items indiscriminately chosen from the Bainsian, Stiglerian and von
Weizsacker analyses of entry barriers. Not only
would such a list contain items that conflict with
each other, it would be too onerous for practical use
in administrative law, and would ignore many of the
breakthroughs that have been experienced in this
area. In other words, it does not enhance a complete
and cautious analysis to combine several different
schools of thought on entry barriers. The more narrow von Weizsdicker view of entry barriers, combined with a recognition of the role of sunk costs, is
most in keeping with the goals of public utility regulation in general.
Third, several economic conditions anecdotally
considered to be "entry barriers" are not entry barriers conforming to the modern view of this topic. As
previously explained, "high" capital costs, or fixed
costs, are not necessarily entry barriers, and it serves
no purpose to automatically and seriously consider
these as entry barriers. Similarly, auction processes,
which have been proposed for allocation of the radio
spectrum, are not entry barriers simply because some
firms have more available cash reserves than others.
And product differentiation is not an entry barrier
unless it requires new entrants to incur significant
portions of sunk costs, and these cost differentials between entrant and incumbent lead to welfare losses.
This is not likely to be the case, as all firms newly
entering a market must expend resources to establish
a market presence. The fact that they must do this,
entry barriers may be present if entrants must incur significant
amounts of sunk costs to surmount the high MVS. It is the sunk
costs that exacerbate this situation, not the scale or scope economies (or resulting high MVS).
128
VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON, supra note 119, at
163.
129
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and that other firms are already operating in the
market, does not comprise an entry barrier.
VII.

CONSIDERATIONS
FIRM SIZE

OF

RELATIVE

Several state statutes have employed the criterion
of relative size considerations, e.g., Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington. The FCC also employed
this criterion in its LD Competition Order.This criterion could serve as an ancillary element to more
substantive criteria, but as a stand-alone criterion it
is generally not useful. The financial or technical resources of competitors relative to those of incumbent
firms are of very limited value for making a determination of whether a market is competitive. The economic reasoning used to arrive at this conclusion is
essentially the same as that employed in concluding
"high" capital costs are not entry barriers.
Even if this criterion was meaningful, it is difficult
to compare most firms with a large multiproduct
firm, like a telephone company, in a meaningful
way. The extent of common facilities used to provide
diverse telecommunications services makes this quite
a challenge, so any results garnered in support of
this must be tempered with judgment. For example,
suppose a LEC was to compete with a firm that provides only data services. The LEC's analog private
line and packet switched services use the public
switched network, which is also used to provide a
great many other services. How does one compare
the resources of the LEC with such competitors?
Does the use of the public switched network by the
LEC mean that it impedes what otherwise would
have been a competitive market? The answer is No,
and it points out one of the dangerous aspects of this
criterion, i.e., a comparison of a LEC's resources
with those of an entrant that is inefficient for lack of
scope economies and cannot compete on the merits
with the LEC via price.
It is acknowledged that market share should be
examined in determining market competitiveness issues, but as the discussion in Section V(C) of this
Article has already indicated, it is not a stand-alone
indicator of market power. Recall that market power
is directly related to market shares, all other factors
remaining constant, but this simple relationship does
not make market share a reliable indicator of market
power. If it is to be used, it must be qualified using
other relevant data on the market in question, such
as ease of entry. 3 ' Because of the effects of market
130
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supply elasticity and the price elasticity of demand,
both of which are inversely related to market power,
a "low" market share is indicative of a lack of market power, but a "high" market share does not necessarily indicate that market power exists.
VIII.

SUMMARY
COMMENTS

AND

PARTING

This Article serves as an economic guide to compliance with competitive standards in telecommunications law. Some of the principles involved in demonstrating that a given market is subject to
significant competition probably seem like complicated, jargon-laden economic theories to attorneys,
public utility commissioners, hearing examiners, or
administrative law judges. This Article is intended to
clarify some of the underlying economic issues and
topics, such as market share, market power, entry
barriers, and demand elasticities.
Despite the economically sound competitive standards we now observe in several state statutes and in
the FCC's regulation of telecommunications, the
value of a pervasive, uniform set of standards of
competition for future telecommunications policy
based on regulatory and antitrust economics still
cannot be possibly overstated. Competitive standards
are an extremely important component of future policies that will shape and transform the telecommunications industry. For example, competitive standards
are crucial to the transition from the asymmetric regulation to the deregulation of telecommunications
markets where appropriate. They will be no less important to the proper evaluation of policies in which
regulators mandate competitive access to network facilities, such as collocation, expanded interconnection, and network unbundling in both state and federal regulation. Sound competitive standards will
also be needed in conjunction with existing and future state laws that classify services as "competitive"
and "noncompetitive," or that proscribe cross-subsidy flows from the "noncompetitive" service category to the other(s).
In showing that a regulated firm operates in a
competitive market, should the magnum of proof differ from merger analysis or antitrust cases in which
a defendant firm has been accused of monopolizing a
market? The answer is Yes. The antitrust case law
and the Merger Guidelines offer a great deal of economic wisdom regarding how one should analyze a
market to see if it is competitive. It is not wise, how-
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ever, to graft existing antitrust standards onto telecommunications law, even though merger analysis,
antitrust law, and competitive standards for telecommunications public policy all should be based on the
same economic principles.
The penalty of making erroneous conclusions in
merger analysis is that two firms, neither of which
may have independent market power, will merge to
form a single firm that does. Beyond this point, the
remedy lies in antitrust court if a violation of the law
takes place as a result. The penalty for making erroneous conclusions in an antitrust case is that a defendant that is guilty of harming the competitive
process and inflicting antitrust damages upon its rivals will not be made to pay for his crime. Further,
the market in question will remain monopolized until the next antitrust suit is filed. If, however, a firm
is to make a transition from a monopoly regime to a
competitive market structure, the magnum of proof
should be less onerous because the public interest
could be harmed if policy does not err on the side of
a finding of competition. The reason is that if a regulated firm is granted reduced regulatory oversight
via banded pricing, then it most likely will seek to
lower its prices if the market is competitive. This, of
course, benefits the public. If, on the other hand, a
regulated firm is granted reduced regulatory oversight, and the market is not truly competitive, the
only way it can better its position is to raise prices of
services for which it has market power. This is not
likely to be permitted under reduced regulatory oversight, and would not go undetected even if it were.
How does a regulatory agency know that a given
market is competitive? First, a market need not conform to the letter of the theoretical properties of a
contestable market--which has the perfectly competitive market concept embraced within it. While the
contestable market model of the competitive process
would be an excellent basis for demonstrations of
competition in the face of perfect data, its underlying
assumptions have the potential to be too restrictive
for pragmatic use in administrative law proceedings.
The compromise of workable competition is a better
maxim on which to base determinations of competition for public policy. Such a compromise does not
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open the door to behaviors of regulated firms that
may be inimical to the public interest. As such, two
determinants are of primary importance: (1) the existence of functionally equivalent substitutes at prices
customers consider comparable, and (2) ease of entry. The lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter
the lags of new entry, the less market power existing
firms will have. When the supply capacity of existing firms or potential entrants is highly elastic,
market power is muted and existing market share
does not signify market power. Stated another way, a
market can be considered competitive if the level of
competition from firms that produce reasonably close
substitutes is sufficient to rule out the exercise of significant market power.1" 1 And a market can be considered competitive if the level of competition from
potential entrants is sufficient to rule out the exercise
of significant market power.1 32
As a guide to how sound, competitive standards
should be written into state law, the Oregon statute
(as well as several others similar to it) is a virtual
model of economically responsible criteria. Similarly,
the FCC's LD Competition Order serves as a model
for the interstate jurisdiction. As a rough checklist of
items useful in demonstrating that a market is workably competitive, the following pragmatic criteria
should be given serious consideration: lack of barriers to entry that lead to deviations from the competitive outcome and involve welfare losses to customers;
a proliferation of alternative suppliers with products
or services fulfilling similar customer needs; existing
competing firms with sufficient supply capacity to
serve significant portions of the market, i.e., "low"
shares of market capacity for the incumbent LEC;
evidence of rivalrous price competition among the
firms serving the marketplace; and evidence that
competitors are actively seeking customers via advertising or promotions. Clearly, other determinants
could go on this list as well.
Once uniform competitive standards are in place
in telecommunications law, the key to proper compliance is in the use of sound economic analysis.
Without sound economic analysis, good telecommunications law in the form of state statutes or FCC
orders can easily become bad public policy.
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